Skip to main content
← Back to S Definitions

S[^6^]https: www.tandfonline.com doi full 10.1080 1331677x.2021.1985575

What Is Systemic Risk?

Systemic risk refers to the potential for the collapse of an entire financial system or market, rather than just the failure of individual entities within it. It is a critical concept within financial risk management and financial stability, where the interconnectedness of participants can lead to a cascading failure. When one or more major financial institutions or markets experience distress, systemic risk arises as this distress can spread throughout the system, potentially causing a severe downturn in overall economic growth. The defining characteristic of systemic risk is its "ripple effect" or "contagion," where problems originating in one part of the system transmit to others, even those initially sound46. This can lead to a loss of confidence among capital providers in capital markets45.

History and Origin

The concept of systemic risk has gained significant attention following major financial crises throughout history. While financial panics and crises are not new, the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern financial systems have amplified the potential for systemic events. A pivotal moment for the modern understanding and focus on systemic risk was the financial crisis of 2007–2008. This crisis, rooted in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, rapidly spread through the global financial system. 43, 44The collapse of institutions like Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves internationally, demonstrating how the failure of a single, large, interconnected entity could trigger widespread instability. 42Prior to this, many financial models focused on isolated risks, but the crisis underscored the importance of understanding the interdependencies and feedback loops that could lead to systemic collapse. 40, 41Policymakers and researchers subsequently intensified efforts to identify, measure, and mitigate systemic risk to prevent future catastrophes.
38, 39

Key Takeaways

  • Contagion Effect: Systemic risk is characterized by the potential for a localized failure to spread throughout the financial system via interconnections and dependencies.
    36, 37* Economic Impact: The crystallization of systemic risk can lead to severe economic downturns, impacting real economies and livelihoods.
    34, 35* "Too Big/Connected to Fail": Certain large or highly interconnected financial institutions are considered "systemically important" because their failure could trigger a broader crisis, leading to the "too big to fail" or "too connected to fail" dilemma for regulators.
    33* Regulatory Focus: Mitigating systemic risk is a primary objective for financial regulators and central banks globally, often leading to macroprudential policies aimed at safeguarding the entire system.
    31, 32

Formula and Calculation

Quantifying systemic risk is complex, as it involves the interplay of various factors and is not captured by a single, universally accepted formula. However, various methodologies and indicators have been developed to assess and monitor it. These approaches often involve analyzing network structures, interbank exposures, and the correlation of financial distress across institutions.

One conceptual approach to measuring systemic risk involves comparing the average health of individual financial institutions with the health of the system as a whole. For instance, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland utilizes a measure that involves the "spread" between the average distance-to-default (ADD) and the portfolio distance-to-default (PDD) for a sample of banks.
30

Systemic Risk Indicator=ADDPDDSystemic\ Risk\ Indicator = ADD - PDD

Where:

  • $ADD$ (Average Distance-to-Default) reflects the market's perception of the average insolvency risk among individual banks.
    29* $PDD$ (Portfolio Distance-to-Default) is a similar measure based on a weighted portfolio of the same banks, indicating the insolvency risk of the system as a whole.
    28
    Other advanced methodologies, discussed in academic research such as that published in The Review of Financial Studies: Measuring Systemic Risk, include Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) and Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), which aim to quantify the spillover effects of a firm's distress onto the broader financial system. 27These models leverage statistical techniques like network analysis and extreme value theory to estimate the potential for cascading failures and aggregate losses. 25, 26The goal is to capture how the credit risk of individual entities might contribute to broader instability when considering collective exposures and movements in asset prices.

Interpreting Systemic Risk

Interpreting systemic risk involves understanding the current state of interconnectedness and vulnerabilities within the financial system to gauge the likelihood and potential severity of a systemic event. Regulators and analysts use various indicators, often based on data from large financial institutions, to monitor potential threats to financial stability. 24A high level of systemic risk typically indicates that the financial system is fragile and highly susceptible to shocks, meaning that the failure of a single major firm or market segment could trigger a wider crisis.
22, 23
Indicators of systemic risk might include elevated levels of leverage within the financial sector, increased interconnectedness among institutions, or a significant concentration of risk in specific markets or products. 20, 21Policymakers, particularly central banks, utilize these interpretations to inform their monetary policy decisions and implement regulatory frameworks designed to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience. The objective is to identify and address weaknesses before they escalate into full-blown crises.
18, 19

Hypothetical Example

Consider a hypothetical financial system comprising three large, interconnected banks: Bank A, Bank B, and Bank C. Each bank holds a significant amount of the others' debt and participates in complex derivative contracts with one another.

  1. Initial Shock: Bank A experiences substantial losses on a large portfolio of commercial real estate loans, leading to a significant depletion of its capital. This could stem from unforeseen macroeconomic factors, such as a sudden downturn in the property market.
  2. Contagion Begins: As Bank A's financial health deteriorates, it struggles to meet its obligations to Bank B and Bank C, who are its major creditors. This immediately impacts the balance sheets of Bank B and Bank C, as they must now account for potential losses on their exposures to Bank A.
  3. Spillover Effect: To cover their own losses and maintain liquidity, Bank B and Bank C begin to sell off other assets, including bonds and equities, possibly triggering a broader decline in asset prices across the market. This "fire sale" effect further exacerbates the initial shock.
  4. Loss of Confidence: As news of the struggling banks spreads, depositors and investors lose confidence in the stability of the overall financial system. This could lead to widespread withdrawals from Bank B and Bank C (a "bank run"), forcing them to seek emergency liquidity or risk collapse themselves.
  5. Systemic Event: Without intervention, the failure of Bank A could cascade into the failures of Bank B and Bank C due to their extensive interdependencies and shared leverage. This chain reaction would represent a full-blown systemic event, causing a credit crunch, disrupting payments, and severely impacting the real economy.

Practical Applications

Systemic risk analysis is a cornerstone of modern financial regulation and supervision, implemented by authorities worldwide to maintain financial stability. One key application is in macroprudential policy, where regulators focus on the stability of the entire financial system rather than just individual institutions. For example, following the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 17This legislation aimed to mitigate systemic risk by enhancing oversight of large, interconnected financial institutions and creating mechanisms for orderly resolution of failing firms.
16
Central banks, like the Federal Reserve, actively monitor systemic risk through various reports and indicators, such as the Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15) for banking organizations. 14, 15They use this information to conduct stress testing on large banks, assessing their resilience to adverse economic scenarios and potential contagion. 13Internationally, organizations like the IMF Global Financial Stability Report regularly assess global financial stability and highlight systemic vulnerabilities, promoting coordinated efforts to address cross-border risks. 12These efforts extend to setting capital requirements and liquidity standards to ensure the resilience of the global capital markets against future shocks.

Limitations and Criticisms

Despite significant advancements in understanding and managing systemic risk, several limitations and criticisms persist. One major challenge is the inherent difficulty in precisely measuring and predicting systemic events. The dynamic and evolving nature of financial markets means that new interconnections and vulnerabilities can emerge rapidly, making it difficult for existing models to capture all potential sources of risk. 10, 11Indicators of systemic risk often reflect what the market has already priced in, rather than anticipating future crises.
9
Furthermore, regulatory responses aimed at mitigating systemic risk can sometimes introduce unintended consequences, such as moral hazard. When large financial institutions are perceived as "too big to fail," there can be an implicit expectation of government bailouts, which may incentivize excessive risk-taking. 8Critics also argue that focusing too heavily on preventing systemic collapse can stifle innovation and competition within the financial system. The complexities of global financial integration also mean that even well-intentioned domestic regulatory frameworks may not fully address risks that can originate or spread across international borders, especially during periods of heightened market volatility.
7

Systemic Risk vs. Systematic Risk

Systemic risk and systematic risk are often confused, but they represent distinct concepts in finance.

Systemic Risk: This is the risk of a breakdown of the entire financial system due to the failure of one or more interconnected entities, leading to a cascading effect. It stems from the interdependencies and linkages within the system, where an idiosyncratic event can trigger widespread contagion. The focus is on the stability of the system itself and its potential to cause a severe economic downturn. For example, a major bank failure causing a freeze in interbank lending is a systemic risk scenario.
4, 5, 6
Systematic Risk (Market Risk): Also known as market risk or undiversifiable risk, this refers to the risk inherent in the overall market or economy that affects all assets to some degree. It cannot be eliminated through portfolio diversification and is driven by broad macroeconomic factors such as changes in interest rates, inflation, or recessions. For instance, a general economic recession that causes most stock prices to fall is an example of systematic risk.
2, 3
The key distinction lies in their origin and scope: systemic risk arises from internal vulnerabilities and interconnectedness within the financial system, leading to contagion, while systematic risk originates from external, economy-wide factors that universally impact asset values.

FAQs

Q: Why is systemic risk so important to financial regulators?
A: Systemic risk is paramount to financial regulators because its realization can devastate the real economy, leading to widespread job losses, business failures, and prolonged economic downturns. Regulators aim to protect the public from such catastrophic events by ensuring the stability of the financial system.

Q: Can systemic risk be completely eliminated?
A: It is generally considered impossible to completely eliminate systemic risk due to the inherent interconnectedness and dynamic nature of modern financial systems. However, effective regulatory frameworks and macroprudential policies aim to mitigate its likelihood and severity, building greater resilience into the system.

Q: What are the main causes of systemic risk?
A: Systemic risk can arise from various factors, including excessive leverage within the financial sector, high interconnectedness among financial institutions, concentrated exposures to certain asset classes or activities, information asymmetries, and procyclical behavior where financial activity amplifies economic booms and busts. Macroeconomic shocks can also trigger or exacerbate systemic vulnerabilities.1